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Introduction:  Desert Research and Technology 
Studies (Desert RATS) is a multi-year series of hardware 
and operations tests carried out annually in the high de-
sert of Arizona in the San Francisco Volcanic Field.  
Conducted since 1997, these activities are designed to 
exercise planetary surface hardware and operations in 
conditions where multi-day tests are achievable.  Such 
activities not only test vehicle subsystems through ex-
tended rough-terrain driving, they also stress communi-
cations and operations systems and allow testing of sci-
ence operations approaches to advance human and ro-
botic surface capabilities.  Desert RATS is a venue 
where new ideas can be tested, both individually and as 
part of an operation with multiple elements.  By conduct-
ing operations over multiple yearly cycles, ideas that 
“make the cut” can be iterated and tested during follow-
on years.  This ultimately gives both the hardware and 
the personnel experience in the kind of multi-element 
integrated operations that will be necessary in future 
human planetary exploration.   
Desert RATS 2011 Science Operations Test simu-
lated the management of crewed science operations at 
targets that were beyond the light delay time experienced 
during Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) and lunar surface mis-
sions, such as a mission to a Near-Earth Object (NEO) or 
the martian surface.  Operations at targets at these dis-
tances are likely to be the norm as humans move out of 
the Earth-Moon system.  Operating at these distances 
places significant challenges on mission operations, as 
the imposed light-delay time makes normal, two-way 
conversations extremely inefficient.  Consequently, the 
operations approach for space missions that has been 
exercised during the first half-century of human space 
operations is no longer viable, and new approaches must 
be devised. 
Conduct of the actual test took place between 30 
August and 9 September 2011.  A total of 8 crewmem-
bers participated in a variety of exploration science sce-
narios that tested operations around a NEO using several 
small-pressurized exploration vehicles and a single habi-
tat.  Communications between the “ground” and the 
crew in the field used a 50-second one-way light-time 
delay (110 s total delay), while communications between 
crewmembers in the exploration vehicles and the habitat 
were instantaneous.   
The actual conditions of the simulation, of necessity, 
were unable to mimic the complexity of proximity and 
EVA operations in the vicinity of a heterogeneous small 
body such as a NEO.  However, the introduced commu-
nications constraints did allow the test team to under-
stand the effects of long light-delay times on operational 
approaches.  Bleacher, et. al. [1] discuss in more detail 
the field operations and lessons learned by the crew-
members.  This report will discuss the operational ap-
proaches and lessons learned by the Science Operations 
Team that operated out of the Mission Control Facility at 
the Johnson Space Center. 
Science Operations Management Approach:  In 
previous Desert RATS operations, the science support 
room has operated from the Black Point Base Camp area 
near Flagstaff, AZ.  This approach was driven by a com-
bination of communications infrastructure constraints 
and general desire for the operations team to be physi-
cally close to the mission infrastructure to allow real-
time, face-to-face contact between different mission 
teams.  This permitted the overall mission team to man-
age both nominal and contingency operations more effi-
ciently by allowing team members to meet and resolve 
issues face-to-face.  However, the maturity of the Desert 
RATS team and a desire to test operations from a distant 
venue led to the decision to conduct the 2011 operation 
from the Mission Control Facility at Johnson Space Cen-
ter.  In addition, as planning was proceeding it was de-
cided to add the European Space Agency as one of the 
science operations control nodes for a portion of the test. 
Significant two-way delay times in communications 
are a standard part of operating planetary surface explo-
ration operations, and the Mars Exploration Program has 
demonstrated increasing proficiency in managing these 
operations over the last 20 years.  However, all previous 
human space operations have been managed with one-
way delay times of ≤5 seconds.  In order to stress the 
operational system, the delay time was introduced to 
simulate operations at a NEO.  Extensive dry run testing 
at Johnson Space Center in the spring and summer of 
2011 showed that two way conversations were simply 
untenable – in particular, the 50-second delay was suffi-
ciently long that, in the normal workload of running a 
surface operation, it was possible to forget that a conver-
sation had been initiated by the time a response had been 
received.  Consequently, it was clear early on that other 
methods of communication would be necessary.  Also, 
the present Deep Space Network places limitations on 
the amount of data that can be returned in a given time 
period.  Improvements, such as the use of laser-based 
communications devices, could increase the data return, 
but such upgrades are not yet included in mission plan-
ning.  As a result, it was decided to test the effect on 
operations using bandwidths that simulated present DSN 
conditions and a future, upgraded system capability. 
Dry run test results showed that collection, man-
agement and interpretation of science data would be a 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20120003306 2019-08-30T19:24:44+00:00Z
“one-shot” deal; that is, the communications delay would 
not allow science team members to request clarification 
or repetition of science observations.  Consequently, the 
decision was made to expand the number of science 
team members collecting written geologic context and 
sample data, and to separate the transcription of that data 
from the collection of visual data through “frame grab-
bing”.  In addition, it was recognized that interaction 
with the crew could be more efficient through the use of 
one-way text messaging rather than verbal communica-
tion.   
By varying the conditions of individual test runs be-
tween the number of exploration vehicles in the field, the 
number of crewmembers in each vehicle, the number of 
crewmembers on EVA and the crewmembers who inter-
acted with the operations team, the science team was 
able to evaluate which configuration provided the most 
efficient operations.  Lastly, communications within the 
operations control room have traditionally been con-
ducted over voice “loops” within a given specific team, 
and within the larger control team.  This year, the use of 
text communications and the need for a fast approval 
cycle for uplinked texts prompted the Data Manager to 
experiment with chat rooms as a method of communica-
tion within the control room. 
Lessons Learned:  (1) The Science Operations 
Team was able to assess the geology of each during crew 
EVAs in order to solve critical, original geologic prob-
lems in real time. This was accomplished through a 
combination of good observations by the crew, good 
communication of those observations, and the scientific 
skills of the Science Team in Houston. (2) Conducting 
tactical science operations with a communications delay 
proved far less onerous than was imagined prior to the 
beginning of the test, leading to a smoother operations 
tempo than expected.  In particular, the Science Team 
members responsible for collecting data were able to 
acquire and process the data that was coming down 
without few issues relative to missed data or problems 
associated with the inability to interact with the crew in 
real time.  (3) Integrating the Science Operations Team 
in the same room as the Mission Operations Team was 
very successful, resulting in good communications and 
decision making between the Science Operations Team 
and their Mission Operations counterparts. In particular, 
having the Science Lead seated next to the Flight Direc-
tor and the CAPCOMM and SCICOM operating the 
same console led to good communication for all phases 
of the operations.  (4) The mix of Science Operations 
Team positions and the number of team members 
worked well, although there were issues where some 
operational phases left team members under-utilized, 
while others phases pushed every team member to oper-
ate at their limits. (5) The use of the chat pages for 
communication within the Science Operations team 
worked very well.  In particular, using chatrooms cut 
down on the chatter on the voice loops, and gave the 
Science PI and the Flight Director a method to quickly 
review draft text messages prior to uplink by the Science 
Communicator (SCICOM) and the primary crew contact 
(CAPCOM) without overloading voice loops. (6) Opera-
tions with ESA went smoothly, in spite of limited time 
and budget that ESA had available to assemble, organize 
and practice for this mission.  (7) During the periods of 
restricted bandwidth, the flow of science information 
from the field to the Science Operations team room was 
adequate to conduct real-time, tactical science opera-
tions, but was not sufficient to have run a strategic 
analysis team as was done during Desert RATS 2010 [2].  
(8) Texting works.  The ability to text to crewmembers 
smoothed out science information flow between the Sci-
ence Team and the crew more efficiently than was an-
ticipated prior to the test, particularly with an IV crew-
member in the loop.  In particular, interaction with the 
crew could be accomplished with a combination of tex-
ting and voice depending on the time sensitivity of the 
information.  (9) Using a crewmember in a real-time, 
IVA “Control Room Forward” role appeared to the Sci-
ence Team to be the most efficient way of conducting 
science operations with a time-delay.  The IVA crew-
member operated as an efficient information buffer for 
the operations flow between the Science Operations 
Team and the crew on the outcrop, working the text in-
puts from the Science Operations Team into real time 
actions for the crew while still maintaining situational 
awareness of the operations in the field. (10) Data man-
agement systems need to be integrated better to link 
sample and geologic context data within a geographic, 
and to allow operations teams to link image data without 
a chance of image ID-tag errors.  Image data, in particu-
lar, can be difficult to re-find if image numbers are in-
correctly copied between competing databases. 
The 2011 RATS Science Operations Test was ex-
tremely successful, testing new operations approaches to 
managing science data and crew operations on planetary 
surfaces under communications and data constraints not 
experienced during previous human spaceflight opera-
tions.   
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